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MODEST RETRIBUTIVISM
Mitchell N. Berman*

(March 19, 2014)

INTRODUCTION
Michael Moore is a giant of legal philosophy. Over the course of an academic career that
already spans more than four decades yet shows no signs of abating, Moore has made profound
contributions to our collective understanding of such diverse matters as moral realism and its
implications for law, the relationship between law and psychiatry, the theory of action that undergirds
Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence, the nature of legal interpretation, and, most recently, the
metaphysics of causation. Very probably, though, Moore has achieved his greatest fame and influence
as a theorist and proponent of a retributivist justification for criminal punishment.
When Moore’s first papers in punishment theory appeared in the early 1980s, retributivism was
only starting to recover from what had become, by mid-century, its near-total repudiation in respectable
philosophical circles. Within a generation of Moore’s arrival, however, scholars were widely
contending—albeit more in horror than satisfaction—that retributivism had reemerged as the dominant
account of the moral justifiability of the infliction of criminal punishment.1 Regardless of whether that is
an accurate description of the state of theory in the early twenty-first century (and I confess to some
skepticism), that retributivism has enjoyed a remarkable revival cannot reasonably be questioned. Nor
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Richard Dale Endowed Chair in Law, and Professor of Philosophy, the University of Texas at Austin. A distant
predecessor to this paper was presented at the Colloquium on Moral versus Political Perspectives on the Criminal
Law, held at Berkeley Law in October, 2013. I am very grateful to the organizers and participants at that event for
helpful reactions, and especially wish to acknowledge debts to Antony Duff, Alon Harel, Leora Katz, Chris Kutz,
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1
See, e.g., Mirko Bagaric & Kumar Amarasekara, “The Errors of Retributivism,” 24 Melb. U. L. Rev. 124 (2000), 126.
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can it be seriously doubted that Moore himself bears greater responsibility for the retributivist
renaissance than does any other scholar. Moore is the foremost living retributivist among Anglophone
moral theorists and philosophers of law.
My goal in this paper is to critically assess the form of retributivism that Moore has advocated,
with rigor and acuity, and to great success. Plausibly, and only to a first approximation, the core
retributivist claim—the claim that distinguishes retributivist views from their nonretributivist
alternatives—holds that it is intrinsically valuable or right to furnish wrongdoers with the negative
consequences that they deserve. But Moore claims much more for a wrongdoer’s negative desert than
this. That is, he attributes significantly greater normative force to the non-instrumental value or
rightness of furnishing a wrongdoer with his negative desert than is necessary for a view to qualify as
retributivist. I will call Moore’s retributivism “robust retributivism.” An account that resides in a nearly
polar neighborhood of retributivist logical space may be labeled “modest retributivism.” In this paper, I
sketch robust and modest retributivism and aim to make the latter more eligible, principally by raising
doubts about Moore’s arguments for each of the components that jointly comprise the former. My
ambition is neither to defend modest retributivism nor to defeat robust retributivism. It is to establish
that retributivism embraces a greater diversity of possible and even plausible views than Moore himself
allows—including views that, in a fairly straightforward sense, are considerably more moderate than the
version that Moore has defended.

I. THE CORE OF RETRIBUTIVISM
Any simple definition of retributivism will be contestable. That acknowledged, it is widely
agreed that, for a justification of punishment to qualify as retributivist, a wrongdoer’s negative desert
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must play some significant role in the justificatory account.2 Very probably, little can be said about the
particular nature of desert’s role, or about how it figures into the logic of the justificatory argument,
without taking sides in intra-retributivist disagreements. Accordingly, if any claim can be fairly identified
as core or central to retributivism, let alone definitional of it, that claim must be formulated in quite
general or vague terms.
Commentators reflect this point when describing retributivism as the theory, say, that
punishment must be justified “in terms of” a wrongdoer’s negative desert.3 Yet that is perhaps a little
too general or vague. Consider the most commonly espoused version of a “mixed theory”—the view (to
a first approximation) that punishment is justified if and only if it produces net good consequences and
is not inflicted on persons who lack negative desert.4 Such a view justifies punishment by reference, in
part, to an offender’s negative desert and therefore would count as retributivist if mere reference to
desert were sufficient to render a justification of punishment retributivist. And sure enough, John
Mackie’s name for this view—“negative retributivism”5–held for some batch of years. Increasingly,
however, philosophers of punishment find it more accurate or illuminating to locate this position
outside of retributivism, many preferring Antony Duff’s apt label for this view, “side-constrained
consequentialism.”6
Here, then, is a stab (subject to refinement) at the core retributivist thesis:

2

Doug Husak makes the same observation in his contribution to this volume. See Douglas Husak, What do
Criminals Deserve? (this volume).
3
C.L. Ten, Crime, Guilt, and Punishment (New York: Clarendon, 1987), 46.
4
I say this is only a first approximation of the view because those who reject wholly objective conceptions of moral
justification would likely add some sort of epistemic qualifiers, possibly at two places. A partially subjectivized
variant of this version of the mixed theory might maintain, for example, that punishment is justified if and only if it
is reasonably expected to produce net good consequences and is not knowingly inflicted on persons who lack
negative desert, or is inflicted only on persons whom the punishing authorities believe in good faith to deserve it,
or something along these lines.
5
J.L. Mackie, “Morality and the Retributive Emotions,” 1 Crim. J. Ethics 3 (1982), 3.
6
R.A. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (New York: Oxford, 2001), 11.
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(R)

The goodness or rightness of satisfying a wrongdoer’s negative desert morally justifies
the infliction of criminal punishment, without regard for any further good consequences
that might be realized as a contingent result of satisfying the wrongdoer’s desert.7

I do not claim that acceptance of (R) is definitional of any thesis properly denominated
“retributivist.” Still, it is highly likely that (R) is accepted by the overwhelming majority of extant views
about punishment that are considered retributivist by their adherents and critics alike. Importantly, (R)
takes no position on such contested matters within the retributivist camp as what a wrongdoer’s
negative desert consists in (e.g., suffering, or being punished),8 or whether the logical structure of the
justification that a wrongdoer’s negative desert provides is consequentialist or deontological.

II. MOOREAN RETRIBUTIVISM
In a well-known portion of his 1984 book, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship,
reprinted and revised as “Closet Retributivism” thirteen years later in his Placing Blame: A General
Theory of the Criminal Law, Moore explains what retributivism is, and is not. It is not, says Moore, any
of several views with which it has frequently been confused. For example, it is not lex talionis, for
retributivists qua retributivists need not endorse any single view of the proper measure of punishment.
It is also not “negative retributivism,” for whilst retributivists will endorse this position, one need not be
a retributivist to do so. “The distinctive aspect of retributivism is that the moral desert of an offender is
7

(R) should not be taken to claim that the goodness or rightness of satisfying a wrongdoer’s negative desert
justifies the infliction of punishment “conclusively” or “all things considered,” without regard for other
considerations. The form of moral justification at issue in (R) is what I call “tailored.” I elaborate on the distinction
in Section III.B, below.
8
On Feinberg’s influential triadic analysis of desert, an agent, A, deserves some treatment or state of affairs, O, on
account of some action or property, B. Feinberg called that which grounds a deserved treatment (B, in the
statement above) the “desert basis.” Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970). I call that which is deserved (O, in the statement above) the
“desert object.” To suffer and to be punished are different desert objects if, as is widely accepted, punishment
itself is defined in partly functional or intentional terms, say as a treatment intended to be experienced as
disagreeable by the subject upon whom it is imposed. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays
in the Philosophy of Law (New York: Oxford, 1968), 4-5. If what a wrongdoer deserves is to suffer, then his
negative desert can be realized even if he is not punished. What about the converse? Is it punishment if the
person subjected to it does not suffer? Or, better, must punishment be designed to inflict suffering (or something
close to it)? People hold different views about this.
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a sufficient reason to punish him,” and not only, as negative retributivism maintains, that it is a
necessary condition.9 Similarly, retributivism is not a denunciatory theory of punishment, “should not
be confused with a theory of formal justice (the treating of like cases alike),” and is not the view “that
punishment of offenders satisfies the desires for vengeance of their victims, . . . [or] that the preferences
of all citizens (not just crime victims) should be satisfied, . . . [or] that punishment is justified because
without it vengeful citizens would take the law into their own hands.”
Retributivism is none of these things. Instead, it
is a very straightforward theory of punishment: We are justified in punishing because
and only because offenders deserve it. Moral responsibility (“desert”) in such a view is
not only necessary for justified punishment, it is also sufficient. Such sufficiency of
justification gives society more than merely a right to punish culpable offenders. It does
this, making it not unfair to punish them, but retributivism justifies more than this. For
a retributivist, the moral responsibility of an offender also gives society the duty to
punish. Retributivism, in other words, is truly a theory of justice such that, if it is true,
we have an obligation to set up institutions so that retribution is achieved.10
I accept each and every contention in Moore’s list of “not’s.” None of the views from which
Moore withholds the retributivist label is equivalent to, entails, or is entailed by, (R). But nor does the
rejection of these several views entail the theory that Moore ends up advancing as the definition of
retributivism. Three features of Moore’s definition of retributivism warrant isolation and attention in
particular.
First, for Moore, the goodness or rightness of giving wrongdoers what they deserve does not
justify criminal punishment only in the sense that it renders the infliction of punishment morally
permissible. Rather, the goodness or rightness of giving wrongdoers what they deserve grounds a moral
obligation to inflict criminal punishment. In a footnote that follows the fourth sentence in the passage
quoted above, Moore specifically cites K.G. Armstrong for the proposition that retributivism “only

9

Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law 88 (New York: Oxford, 1997), 88. For
simplicity, all citations to Moore’s work will be to Placing Blame alone, and not also to predecessor books and
articles.
10
Moore, Placing Blame, at 91 (emphases in original; citation omitted).
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giv[es] the state the right to punish but not the duty to do so,” but dismisses this view as yet another
“mischaracterization of retributivism.”11 As he puts it elsewhere, while “[t]he desert of offenders
certainly gives [state] officials permission to punish offenders, . . . retributivism goes further. As a theory
of a kind of justice, it obligates us to seek retribution through the punishment of the guilty.”12
Second, the goodness or rightness of giving wrongdoers what they deserve does not merely
justify (by making obligatory) the infliction of punishment in an individual case. Rather, it grounds an
obligation to establish and maintain institutions devoted to the imposition of criminal punishment. The
obligation to inflict retributivist punishment, says Moore, “means that officials have a duty to punish
deserving offenders and that citizens have a duty to set up and support institutions that achieve such
punishments.”13
Third, it is not merely the case that the goodness or rightness of giving wrongdoers what they
deserve, without regard for any further good consequences of doing so, is sufficient to justify the
infliction of criminal punishment. Rather, Moorean retributivism maintains that effectuating just
deserts is the only goal, consideration, or rationale that can justify criminal punishment. It is “only
because” offenders deserve punishment that we are justified in inflicting it.
Each of the foregoing three features stakes a position on a distinct dimension on which different
accounts of the justifiability of punishment could plausibly vary. Call these the dimensions, respectively,
of force, scope, and exclusivity. With respect to force, Moore maintains that, not only does the
goodness or rightness of inflicting negative desert provide a reason to inflict punishment that is
sometimes adequate to justify it all things considered, but it grounds a duty to do so as well. With
respect to scope, he contends that a wrongdoer’s negative desert provides an obligation, not only to
11

More precisely, Moore calls Armstrong’s conception “perhaps an eighth mischaracterization of retributivism.”
Moore, Placing Blame, at 91 n.17 (citing K.G. Armstrong, “The Retributivist Hits Back,” in H.B. Acton (ed.), The
Philosophy of Punishment (London: Macmillan,1969)). It is hard to know what sense to make of that
(uncharacteristically) fudgy “perhaps.”
12
Moore, Placing Blame, at 154 (emphases in original).
13
Id.
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impose criminal punishment in individual cases, but to establish and maintain institutions of criminal
punishment as well. And with regard to exclusivity, Moore claims that furnishing negative consequences
because they are deserved is the only morally acceptable justification for the infliction of criminal
punishment.
Let us call this package of views “robust retributivism.” It is a stipulated term of art. David
Dolinko termed a version of retributivism that is strong on the dimension of force alone (i.e., that views
the satisfying of negative desert not only as permissible but as obligatory) “bold” retributivism.14 Robust
retributivism is triply bold.
A retributivist package of views that represents a polar alternative to robust retributivism would
differ on all three of these dimensions. It would maintain that the value or rightness of realizing
negative desert provides reason to punish but does not ground an obligation to punish; that
considerations other than desert must be relied upon to justify the creation and maintenance of an
institution of criminal punishment; and that proper recognition of the moral significance of negative
desert does not foreclose the possibility that the act or institution of punishment could be justified on
the strength of other values or reasons. Call this package “modest retributivism.” The two positions are
summarized in the table below.

14

David Dolinko, “Some Thoughts About Retributivism,” 101 Ethics 537 (1991), 542.
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Scope

Force

Exclusivity

Robust Retributivism
Negative desert justifies the
institution of punishment as well as
individual instances.

Negative desert grounds not only a
reason to punish but a duty to punish
as well.
Negative desert grounds the only
morally acceptable justification for
the infliction of criminal punishment.

Modest Retributivism
Negative desert justifies the infliction
of punishment on wrongdoers, but
does not by itself justify creation and
maintenance of the institution of
criminal punishment.
Negative desert grounds only a
reason to punish, and not also a duty.
Although negative desert can justify
the infliction of criminal punishment,
punishment is at least potentially
justifiable on other grounds as well.

There are possible views intermediate between robust and modest retributivism. For example,
one could maintain that negative desert justifies the institution of punishment but is not the only
potentially available ground for a satisfactory justification. In focusing on the especially minimal account
that I am calling modest retributivism, I do not intend to deny or disparage this or any other
intermediate options. Similarly, the dimensions of force, scope, and exclusivity are not the only
dimensions on which versions of retributivism could differ. I do not even claim that they are the most
significant ones. I claim only that they are significant enough to warrant our attention.

III. LESS THAN MOORE
To reiterate a point made earlier, I am not setting out to show that Moorean robust
retributivism is wrong or defective. I aim only to show that several of the elements that comprise it are
optional from a retributivist perspective. Moore himself equates his version of retributivism (what I’m
terming “robust retributivism”) with retributivism, simpliciter. It is my impression that many people
view things just that way. My aim here is to raise doubts about that equation and thus to make more
apparent other retributivist possibilities, in particular possibilities that require negative desert to do
significantly less work than Moore demands of it.
8
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A. Force
In his 1993 article, Justifying Retributivism, Moore acknowledged (for the first time in print, as
far as I’m aware) that retributivism could be a consequentialist approach to justifying punishment. “One
can, of course, define retributivism so that a retributivist must be a deontologist,” he remarked. But
that would be a mistake. The “distinctively retributivist” thesis, he insisted—broadly in accord with
(R)—is “that the guilty receiving their just deserts is an intrinsic good.”15
Yet, as we have seen, Moore also contends that we have a duty or obligation both to inflict
punishment on wrongdoers and to establish institutions whose purpose or function is to mete out
retributive punishment. It seems plain on the face of things that these claims go far beyond (R) or the
view that Moore has described as “distinctively retributivist.” Not plain, in my estimation, are the
arguments that Moore advances for this bolder position.
Let us start with the dimension of force. The usual arguments for retributivism, including those
advanced by Moore, depend heavily upon thought experiments.16 Common are two-world
hypotheticals: Worlds A and B are identical in all respects except that, in A, some vicious wrongdoer
suffers or is punished on account of his wrongs, whereas in B he lives happily ever after. If we stipulate
that the punishment or suffering of the wrongdoer in World A does not generate any downstream
consequences that further distinguish the two worlds, and if we think that World A is nonetheless
better, then we have grounds to accept something like (R). And, as Moore has further observed, your
attachment to (R) might be strengthened by imagining that you are the wrongdoer and by then
reflecting both on the guilt that you would yourself experience, and the judgment that you might reach
that you too should be punished.17 If we believe that there is value in the satisfaction of negative
desert, and if we further believe that, presumptively, we have some reason to bring about valuable

15

Moore, Placing Blame, at 157.
See, e.g., John Kleinig, Punishment and Desert (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 67.
17
Moore, Placing Blame, at 145-49.
16
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states of affairs, then we should conclude that we have reason to promote the satisfaction of negative
desert.
Notice that I have spoken so far only in terms of value and reason. I have said nothing about
duties, obligations, or justice, for the simple reason that nothing about hypotheticals of this kind
naturally invites conclusions formulated in such terms. Moore, however, maintains that we have a
“duty” or “obligation” to satisfy negative deserts, and that such a duty or obligation is one of “justice.”
Frankly, I am uncertain precisely what Moore means by these terms or what their normative
upshot is. I assume only (thanks in part to the frequent use of italics) that Moore understands and
intends to signal a normative escalation. On most accounts, duties and obligations are not only moral
reasons but reasons that are particularly weighty or have second-order exclusionary characteristics, or
are in other respects especially stringent (even if not “absolute” or “conclusive”). I therefore interpret
the move from normative concepts like “reason,” “right,” “permissible” and “justified” to “duty,”
“obligation,” and “justice” to raise the stakes, so to speak. Yet I do not see what about the thought
experiments themselves warrants any normative escalation from claims about value and reason to
claims about duties of justice, nor am I aware of distinct arguments that Moore provides for this move.
We must be careful not to start by assuming that the justification for which we search will necessarily
supply obligations and not merely reasons and permissions, or even that retributivism is a form of
justice. That would be to put the rabbit in the hat.
To be sure, Moore could maintain, perhaps following Aristotle, that duty and justice are built
into the very concept of desert. On one such view, for example, it is a conceptual entailment of the
proposition that A deserves O that justice demands that A get O, and we are all under a standing
obligation to advance justice. There are difficulties with this account of desert, for it is common, and not
clearly mistaken, to assert in some contexts both that some A deserves φ, and that nobody is obligated

10

Berman, Modest Retributivism
to see that A gets φ.18 But even if the contention that justice and obligation are built into the concept of
desert can be successfully defended, it would remain for Moore to establish that the reactions that the
retributivists’ two-world hypotheticals frequently pump go beyond judgments that it is good or right
that the blameworthy wrongdoers at issue “suffer” (or “are punished”), and really amount to judgments
that the wrongdoers “deserve” to suffer (or to be punished) in the particular sense of desert that entails
that others are obligated to furnish such suffering (or punishment).19 This cannot be taken for granted.
B. Scope
So much for my doubts about the robust retributivist position on the dimension of force.
Suppose, however, that this aspect of robust retributivism is correct even if not definitional of
retributivism: we, or some of us, have a duty to inflict deserved suffering or deserved punishment on
wrongdoers. Does it follow that we have a duty to establish and maintain institutions of criminal
punishment (still assuming that duties are especially stringent in some fashion yet to be fully
elucidated)? Again, it is hard to know for sure without knowing what such a duty amounts to. But it is
important to note that the thought experiments upon which retributivists rely do not require that
conclusion: they are generally about individual cases.
More significantly, the focus on individual cases appears nonaccidental once we reflect on what
retributivist theories of punishment are (or at least can be) designed or offered to do. Some
commentators, perhaps influenced by Hart’s insistence on distinguishing between the “general justifying
aim” of punishment and principles of distribution, assume that theories of punishment must be
designed to justify the institution of criminal punishment and not just individual inflictions of
18

For elaboration, see Mitchell N. Berman, “Rehabilitating Retributivism,” 32 Law & Phil. 83 (2013), 90-93.
This is an appropriate place to register my own tentative sense that prevailing views regarding the sort of thing
that desert is might be mistaken. Husak describes desert as a “reason-giving property.” Husak, What Do Criminals
Deserve? (ms. at 7). Moore often says similar things, see Moore, Placing Blame, at 168 n.25, 178, 180, though
elsewhere he describes desert as a “principle.” Id. at 170, 171. I am disposed to doubt that desert is best
conceived as a property belonging to individuals. But because this is not the place to elaborate on my doubts, I
have tried in this paper to speak of desert in terms that square with common understandings and usage. Some
things I say in this paper—possibly including my formulation of (R)—could require restatement to accord with the
conception of desert (negative or otherwise) that I might ultimately favor.
19
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punishment. I think this is a consequentialist bias, and that the argumentative dialectic concerning the
justification of punishment does not require retributivists to have been arguing that the institution of
punishment can be justified by reference to the goodness or rightness of furnishing deserved suffering.
I have argued elsewhere that it is useful to distinguish two types of justification: all-thingsconsidered, and “tailored.”20 An all-things-considered justification of an act or practice is just what it
sounds like: it purports to establish that the act or practice is morally permitted in light of all
considerations. A tailored justification aims to establish the permissibility of the act or practice at issue
against one or more grounds for doubt, what I have termed “demand bases.” It shows that the
particular grounds explicitly invoked or implicitly relied upon for thinking the act or practice unjustifiable
are chimerical or overridden.
In my view, the dominant strand within punishment theory has involved the effort to provide
tailored justifications against the particularly salient and forceful complaint that it is wrongful to
intentionally cause people to suffer. (R) is a promising response to this demand basis. As such, it can be
sensibly advanced to justify punishment in the individual case. The argument can be construed thusly:
assuming that there already exists an institution with lawful authority to inflict punishments (or that the
instant case can, for whatever reason, be treated as a one-off that does not require a preexisting
institution dedicated to the infliction of criminal punishment),21 then the fact that a person has done
grave wrong provides a fully sufficient reason to inflict punishment, regardless of whether punishment
in this case would produce any of the goods, or serve any of the values that the institution was created
to serve.
When we turn attention to the entire institution of punishment, however, other objections—
additional demand bases—become salient, indeed inescapable. Here are two: the institution of
punishment consumes substantial social resources that could be put to other uses, and invariably results
20
21

Mitchell N. Berman, “Punishment and Justification,” 118 Ethics 258 (2008), 262-66.
Think of a Nuremberg-like situation, or a domestic equivalent.
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in the infliction of suffering on wholly innocent persons. If I am right that these objections are squarely
on the table in the institutional case but not necessarily in the individual case, then the contention that
we have an obligation to establish institutions of criminal punishment solely on the strength of the value
of realizing negative deserts seems both doubtful and unnecessary to attribute to retributivists, even
though modest retributivists should surely believe that the noninstrumental value of satisfying negative
deserts contributes to a successful justification of the institution.
Some readers may feel that the account I have just offered regarding why a successful
retributivist justification for instances of criminal punishment need not extend to or entail a successful
retributivist justification for the institution of criminal punishment depends too heavily on a particular
contestable account of the dialectical logic of justification. I think, in contrast, that it accurately captures
the truth that distinct questions are sometimes in play. Very frequently, we ask the “what justifies
punishment?” question when we have in mind some particular case of actual or contemplated
punishment. Especially when the familiar consequentialist justifications for punishment strike us as
significantly attenuated (as when the offense charged is sufficiently unusual as to weaken the apparent
need for general deterrence, and when the offender is sufficiently old as to weaken the need for specific
deterrence or incapacitation), the question is posed “what reason have we to punish him?” In such
cases, the retributivist response is: “because he deserves it.” That can be an acceptable answer to the
question on the table (if perhaps a little telegraphic) even if it is not an acceptable answer to the
broader question: “what justifies the creation and maintenance of a system of criminal punishment?”22

22

Husak has recognized that these are different questions and has agreed that negative desert alone goes farther
toward answering the former than the latter. See Douglas Husak, “Holistic Retributivism,” 88 Cal. L. Rev. 991
(2000), 995. But he seems also to believe that the latter question—concerning a “complete justification for
creating an institution of punishment,” id. at 996—is, in some meaningful sense, the real question, and therefore
that retributivism gains greater plausibility than it genuinely warrants “only if we artificially narrow our conception
of the nature” of the problem that we are called upon to resolve. Id. at 993 (emphasis added). Samuel Sheffler
has taken issue with this suggestion of Husak’s, insisting on the independent significance of “the question of
whether and when society’s punishment of an individual is compatible with just treatment of that individual.”
Samuel Sheffler, “Justice and Desert in Liberal Theory,” 88 Cal. L. Rev. 965 (2000), , 987 n.73. I’m with Sheffler on
this point.
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C. Exclusivity
According to Moore, retributivism maintains that negative desert is a necessary and sufficient
condition for infliction of punishment and that, equivalently, “punishment is justified if and only if the
person or persons receiving it deserve it.” 23 Thus, he says, “retributivism asserts that punishment is
properly inflicted because, and only because, the person deserves it.”24 I believe this is doubly mistaken.
Perhaps the most obvious objection would be that an offender’s negative desert does not
constitute a sufficient condition for the justified infliction of punishment. It is always imaginable that
some individual act of punishment would produce horrendous consequences overall and it seems
implausible that, even if we have moral reason, or even obligation, to inflict deserved punishment, such
reasons or obligation are so stringent as to require that we do so regardless of the consequences. This,
however, is one objection I waive, for Moore has made clear, in response to Dolinko’s leveling of this
very charge, that his invocation of sufficiency is intended to be context-sensitive:
when we say that one condition was sufficient for another—as in the counterfactual
statement that a particular fire was sufficient to burn down someone’s house—we
mean that within some limited set of conditions this one by itself was sufficient. Other
conditions outside that set—such as the presence of oxygen in my fire example—are
invariably necessary even while we idiomatically describe a condition within that set as
‘sufficient’.
The retributivist’s usage of ‘sufficiency’ is to be so construed. Within the set of
conditions constituting intelligible reasons to punish, the retributivist asserts, desert is
sufficient, i.e., no other of these conditions is necessary.25
Given this helpful clarification about Moore’s sufficiency claim, my two objections are these.
First, embrace of (R) does not entail that desert is a necessary condition for the infliction of punishment.
Second, even if negative desert is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the justified infliction of
punishment (so long as sufficiency is construed in the somewhat loose manner just described), that does

23

Moore, Placing Blame, at 92.
Id.
25
Id. at 173.
24
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not establish that punishment may be inflicted “because and only because” the person punished
deserves it, on the most common construal of that expression.
1. Retributivism need not be committed to the proposition that negative desert furnishes a
necessary condition for the justified infliction of punishment. Let me say more about the argumentative
dialectic that births not only retributivism but consequentialism too. We hold out for consideration an
actual or hypothetical act of criminal punishment and raise a moral objection: this, we say, is deeply
morally problematic. It is ordinarily profoundly wrongful to treat people in this way. Therefore, if we
are to continue to do such things, we need to explain how it can be morally justified. Our theories of
punishment are efforts to meet this demand. One tradition says, in effect, we can justify doing such
things by reference to the fact that wrongdoers deserve it. Another tradition offers a different account:
we can justify doing such things by the good net consequences thereby produced. Abolitionists believe
that both positions are wrong, and that there are no other better options waiting in the wings. But just
as both accounts could be wrong, both could be right. More significantly, there is no reason why it must
be part of either of these proposed answers to reject the other. To be sure, one who accepts one of the
justificatory theories could, at the same time, reject the other. A retributivist could be an anticonsequentialist about punishment, and a consequentialist could be an anti-retributivist. My point is
only that both types of theory are, by the nature of what they are asked to do, accounts about what
does or can justify punishment; they are not accounts about what does not or cannot justify it.
Therefore, the rejection of consequentialist justifications is no integral part of retributivism, and the
rejection of retributivist justifications is no integral part of consequentialism.26 If this is right, Moore is

26

I am speaking here of consequentialism as a justification of punishment, not as a comprehensive moral theory.
As a comprehensive moral theory, consequentialism does deny deontological retributivism, but because we have
already seen that consequentialist retributivism is a real possibility, it is not even true that consequentialism as a
comprehensive moral theory entails the falsity of all varieties of retributivism.
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simply mistaken to define retributivism as the view that “punishment is justified if and only if the person
or persons receiving it deserve it.”27
Of course, even if I am right that Moore’s “necessary condition” claim attributes more content
to retributivism simpliciter than is warranted, it could still be true that punishment is justified only when
deserved.28 Most criminal law theorists espouse that view and they could well be correct. If they are
correct, however, it is on the strength of a substantive moral judgment to the effect that (to a first
approximation) it is unjust or otherwise wrongful to inflict punishment on somebody who doesn’t
deserve it—or, in a more subjectivist spirit, without a bona fide belief that the person is guilty and
blameworthy. Call that substantive moral claim (Q). But just as consequentialists about punishment
may help themselves to (Q) (witness “side-constrained consequentialism”), retributivists—i.e., those
who accept (R)—are free to eschew it. (R) does not entail (Q).
2. Retributivism need not be committed to the proposition that punishment is justified only
when inflicted “because” the person punished deserves it. Now let us suppose, arguendo, that (R) and
(Q) are both true. If so, we might fairly conclude that negative desert constitutes both a sufficient and a
necessary condition for the justified infliction of punishment (so long as sufficiency is construed in a
sufficiently contextual or pragmatic way), which is also to say that punishment is justified if and only if
the person punished deserves it. Nonetheless, it would not follow that persons may be punished
“because and only because” they deserve it, if that locution means that punishment is justified only
when inflicted for the reason that the person punished deserves it. Conditions need not be reasons, for
the absence of a fact that, if present, would render some action φ impermissible, is a necessary
condition for the permissibility of φing, but not itself a reason to φ.29 That you have not promised not to

27

Moore, Placing Blame, at 91. See also id., at 92.
Or, only when inflicted in the good faith belief that it is deserved, or something similar. See note 4 above.
29
I think that the distinction between conditions and reasons lies close to the heart of the difference between
what Dolinko calls “rational” and “moral” justification, see David Dolinko, “Retributivism, Consequentialism, and
the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment,” 16 Law & Phil. 507 (1997), 518, and what Michael Lessnoff termed
28
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quack like a duck might be a necessary condition for you to be justified in quacking but is not itself a
reason for you to quack. And if you do quack, it would be unnatural to say that you did so “because of”
the fact that you had not promised not to.
So the fact, if true, that a person’s negative desert constitutes both a necessary condition and a
sufficient condition for punishing him does not itself entail that we are justified in punishing somebody
because and only because he has negative desert. But, of course, the latter claim could nonetheless be
true. Are there any reasons for a retributivist (i.e., somebody who endorses (R)) to resist Moore’s
contention that punishment is justified only when inflicted “because” the punishee deserves it?
Here are two. First, one might believe, in a Kantian vein, that the value of an action depends
upon the actor’s motivations or explanatory reasons. Indeed, I think that Moore himself believes this.30
Adding this view to Moore’s claim that, in order for punishment of a wrongdoer to be morally justified,
the offender’s negative desert must supply the reason that punishment is inflicted yields a conclusion
that a retributivist might not want to own. Take the standard imagined case of punishment in which the
person punished deserves it and the punishment would promote net good consequences (even putting
aside any supposed value of realizing negative desert). If we follow Moore (as I construe him) in
believing that, in order for punishment in such a case to be morally justified, the offender’s negative
“teleological” and “entitling” justification. Michael Lessnoff, “Two Justifications of Punishment,” 21 Phil. Q. 141
(1971). The distinction is also fundamental to rights-forfeiture theories of punishment. See, e.g., Christopher
Heath Wellman, “The Rights Forfeiture Theory of Punishment,” 122 Ethics 371 (2012).
30
At one place, Moore comments on the “tension that exists between crime-prevention and retributive goals. . . .
due to retributivism’s inability to share the stage with any other punishment goal. To achieve retributive justice,
the punishment must be inflicted because the offender did the offense. To the extent that someone is punished
for reasons other than that he deserves to be punished, retributive justice is not achieved.” If “part of the reason
motivating those who punish [a wrongdoer] is that his punishment will serve as an example to others,” he says,
then “the criminal justice system is not achieving retributive justice.” Moore, Placing Blame, at 28.
Elsewhere, however, Moore writes that “the only difference” between the two most plausible versions of
mixed theory—desert-constrained consequentialism and consequences-constrained retributivism—“is in the
motivations of those who hold them. And while that may make a difference in our moral judgements of those who
hold the different branches of the mixed theory of punishment, it does not make a difference in terms of the
actual social institutions and judgements such theories will justify.” Id. at 94 (emphasis in original). These
passages strike me as inconsistent insofar as the second appears to convert a consideration that the first treats as
bearing on act evaluations into a matter relevant only to actor evaluations. Still, I would not be so foolhardy as to
rule out that Moore has in mind a basis for reconciling these passages that eludes me.
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desert must supply the reason for punishment, then the value—and possibly the justifiability—of
punishment will depend upon the reasons that move the punishing authorities. A retributivist could
avoid this conclusion by refusing to join Moore in traveling from “if and only if” to “because and only
because.”
Second, there is a cost to contending that punishment is justified only if imposed because—i.e.,
for the reason that—wrongdoers deserve it. Such a claim implies that if, contrary to what the
retributivist believes, (R) is false, then punishment is not morally justifiable: if the only reason that
supposedly favors punishment turns out to be no reason at all, then there are no morally cognizable
reasons to punish. This is a steep price to pay for membership in the retributivist camp. For myself, I
am more confident that morally justified systems, and instances, of criminal punishment are possible
than I am that (R) is true.

IV. RETRIBUTIVISM FROM THE BACK DOOR, AGAIN
In his well-known “argument for retributivism from the back door,” excerpted in several editions
of the highly regarded Kadish & Schulhofer casebook,31 Moore defends the correctness of retributivism
precisely by purporting to have shown that the only “theories of punishment truly competitive with
retributivism, namely, the pure utilitarian theory, and the mixed theory, are each unacceptable to us.”32
But if retributivism supplies the only acceptable justification of criminal punishment, what does it
maintain? I have argued that retributivism is properly understood as committed to something very close
31

See, for example, Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its Processes: Cases and
th
Materials, 5 ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1989), 142-44.
32
Moore, Placing Blame, at 103. Some philosophers of punishment will reject the starting assumption that
consequentialist, retributivist, and mixed theories exhaust the possible justifications of punishment. Additional
possibilities would be deontological accounts that do not assume, and might even deny, that the suffering that a
wrongdoer experiences is either good or right. Duff’s communicative theory is plausibly one such view, as is the
view that we act rightfully in (temporarily or permanently) removing wrongdoers from law-abiding society. With
many others, I am skeptical that the non-retributivist deontological positions on offer have the resources to justify
treatment that rightly qualifies as punishment, see my “The Justification of Punishment,” in Andrei Marmor (ed.),
The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law (New York: Routledge, 2012), 141, but we can safely table that
question for the limited purposes of this essay.
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to (R), and that the version of retributivism that Moore himself embraces goes significantly beyond this
minimal content, on at least three discrete dimensions of variability.
Have I, at the same time, done anything to bolster the prospects for retributivism of any form?
Not directly, for I offer no new arguments for (R) itself. Perhaps, though, my effort to identify respects
in which Moorean retributivism goes beyond minimal retributivist commitments can serve as an indirect
argument for modest retributivism, or something in its vicinity. Readers who had been disposed against
Moorean robust retributivism, but had not appreciated the availability of accounts that claim much less
for negative desert, might now be moved to reconsider their resistance to retributivism tout court. This
argument, then, like Moore’s, proceeds through the back door.
But is it a back door to the same house? Because modest retributivism is so unbold—perhaps
even timid or pallid?—one might wonder whether it fairly qualifies as a version of retributivism at all.33
It is impossible to address this concern fully without wading deeply into methodological debates
concerning the demarcation and analysis of concepts. In concluding that what I am terming modest
retributivism is indeed a version of retributivism, I rely heavily on my impressions of the criteria that
criminal law theorists seem to invoke or have in mind when characterizing their own views, or even
themselves, as retributivist or anti-retributivist. As a descriptive matter, it appears to me that the line
between avowed retributivists and their avowed critics is most faithfully drawn between those who
believe and those who deny that a wrongdoer morally deserves to suffer (or to experience hardship or
deprivation, or the like) in any sense of desert that would provide some others, including the state, with

33

Duff describes “the core retributivist thought” differently than I do. The core thought, in his view, is “that what
gives criminal punishment its meaning and the core of its normative justification is its relationship, not to any
contingent future benefits that it might bring, but to the past crime for which it is imposed.” R.A. Duff, “Retrieving
Retributivism,” in Mark D. White (ed.), Retributivism: Essays on Theory and Policy (New York: Oxford, 2011), 3. I do
not think that an account need view desert as supplying the “core normative justification” for punishment for it to
qualify as retributivist.
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reasons—nontrivial reasons, or reasons that can at least sometimes make a difference—to provide that
suffering or deprivation.34
(R) aims to capture the proposition that self-described retributivists overwhelmingly accept and
that their self-described opponents overwhelmingly reject. But the pith of retributivism could perhaps
be put in simpler and more colloquial terms: Ceteris paribus, the world goes better when wrongdoers
receive their comeuppance.

34

Moore once opined that “[t]he true worry that most people have about retributivism” is that retributivist
emotions, urges, and judgments are always pathological. Moore, Placing Blame, at 119. I take this be offered as
an explanation for many people’s rejection of the central retributivist thesis. My experience jibes with Moore’s
observation.
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